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Abstract. We prove a conjecture by A. Pnueli and strengthen it showing a sequence of
“counting modalities” none of which is expressible in the temporal logic generated by the
previous modalities, over the real line, or over the positive reals. Moreover, there is no
finite temporal logic that can express all of them over the real line, so that no finite metric
temporal logic is expressively complete.
1. Introduction
Temporal Logic based on the two modalities “Since” and “Until” (TL) is a most popular
framework for reasoning about the evolving of a system in time. By Kamp’s theorem [13] this
logic has the same expressive power as the monadic first order predicate logic. Therefore the
choice between monadic logic and temporal logic is merely a matter of personal preference.
For discrete time these logics suffice. A properties like “Every X will be followed
promptly enough by a Y ” can be explicitly written once a number k is chosen, and “promptly
enough” is interpreted as: “Within k steps”.
Temporal logic and the monadic logic are equivalent whether the system evolves in
discrete steps or in continuous time. But for continuous time both logics lack the power
to express properties of the kind just described, and we must strengthen their expressive
power.
Some measure of length of time needs to be included, and the language must be adapted
to it. This is done by assuming that there is a basic unit of length, call it “length 1”. For
predicate logic it is standard procedure to extend the language by a name for the “+1”
function, or for a corresponding relation. It will then be the question which fragment of the
extended language suits our needs.
Extending temporal logic, without relating it to a corresponding predicate logic, de-
pended on the inventiveness and imagination of the researchers, who created an abun-
dance of approaches and notions, in the work of A. Pnueli, R. Koymans, T. Henzinger and
others,[15, 3, 2, 14, 5, 18, 1, 7, 8], and more. Following much work, mainly by Henzinger
and collaborators, most of these approaches seem to converge to equivalent languages.
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We evaluated the situation in [10, 12], when most of the work cited was already done,
and analyzed the temporal logic in relation to predicate logic. This lead to the temporal
logic QTL (Quantitative Temporal Logic), which has besides the modalities Until and
Since two metric modalities: ♦1(X) and
←−
♦1(X). The first one says that X will happen (at
least once) within the next unit of time, and the second says that X happened within the
last unit of time. We showed that this logic is equivalent to the different metric temporal
logics that we found in the literature, like MITL, ECL etc. [2, 1, 7, 8]. We will use in this
paper the logic QTL as the basic metric temporal logic, but the reader who is acquainted
with MITL or any other of the different metric temporal logics should remember that they
are equivalent to QTL in expressive power, so that the results in this work apply to MITL
and those other languages just as well.
Adding the power to say “X will be true (at least once) within the next unit of time” is
natural and necessary. There is however no reason to believe that this gives us the required
expressive power. Is it enough, or do we need to add more modalities? If we must add
more, which ones should we choose?
A. Pnueli was the first to address these questions. He suggested the modality P2(X,Y ):
“X and then Y will both occur in the next unit of time”. Pnueli conjectured that the
modality P2(X,Y ) could not be expressed in MITL and similar logics (we were unable to
locate where this conjecture was first published. It is attributed to Pnueli in later papers
like [2] and [18]).
P2(X,Y ) was probably thought of as a natural strengthening of the simple metric
temporal logics. It can serve as a first in a sequence of extensions of the logic, where for
each natural number n, we add the modality Pn(X1, , . . . ,Xn). Pn(X1, , . . . ,Xn) says that
there is an increasing sequence of points t1, , . . . , tn in the coming unit interval such that
Xi(ti) holds for i = 1, , . . . , n. We call these modalities Pnueli’s modalities.
In this paper we will:
• Prove Pnueli’s conjecture, that P2(X,Y ) cannot be expressed in QTL or MITL.
• Show that none of the modalities Pn(X1, , . . . ,Xn) can be expressed in terms of the
modalities Pn−1(X1, , . . . ,Xn−1), so that we have a strict hierarchy of modalities.
• And the main result: No temporal logic with a finite set of modalities can express all the
modalities Pn(X1, , . . . ,Xn).
This makes clear two points: That an extension of the simple temporal logics is nec-
essary, and that it will not be as simple as it was for plain temporal logic. It will require
infinitely many modalities, and the proper choice is an intriguing question. We hope to
address it soon. Note that in predicate logic the expressive power of formulas grows with
the increasing of their quantifier depth. In temporal logic there are no quantifiers, and for-
mulas become more complex due to increase in the nesting depth of the modalities that they
mention. Kamp showed that for the simplest logic of order iterating the modal operations
can replace the complex use of quantifiers. Our result, together with previous evidence (see
[16]) suggests that this was a lucky peculiarity of the first-order monadic logic of linear
order, and that it cannot be expected to hold for stronger logics.
The main result, that no finite temporal logic can be complete, is not an exact formal
claim, until we specify which source of modalities we have in mind. We will specify a natural
extensive monadic logic of order, that includes the “+1” function in its vocabulary. The
formal claim will concern the modalities which are definable in this logic. When stated
formally the result seems even stronger, as it states not just the incompleteness of temporal
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logics with finitely many modalities, but also of logics with infinitely many modalities, which
are defined using bounded quantifier depth.
To state the formal result we define the counting modalities Cn(X) which are a simple
instance of Pnueli’s modalities. Cn(X) says that X will hold at least at n points within the
next unit of time. Cn(X) is a simple instance of the Pnueli modality Pn(X, , . . . ,X). Our
main theorem is the following:
• Let L be second order monadic logic of order, together with the predicate B(t, s) which
says that s = t+ 1. The modalities Cn(X) are expressible in this logic, but no temporal
logic with a finite or infinite family of modalities which are defined by formulas with
bounded quantifier depth can express all the modalities Cn(X), over the full real line R.
Remark 1. Note that our proof applies only to the entire real line. We conjecture that
the same claim holds for the positive real line R+, but the attempts to prove it became too
cumbersome to carry on.
It is well known that in the theory of order, to express the fact that there is a large
number of points with a given property, requires formulas with large quantifier depth. We
emphasize that the main theorem is not of this nature. Thus in pure temporal logic the
two modalities “Until” and “Since” suffice to express for every n the fact that there are n
points in the future that satisfy X. Less trivial but true, is the fact that in QTL with its
four modalities, for every n there is a formula that says about a point t that X will be true
for the length of the interval (t+ n, t+ n+ 1) [11]. The nesting of the modalities does for
the temporal formulas what the quantifier depth does for the predicate logic formulas. The
theorem says that in the general case modality nesting is strictly weaker than quantifier
depth, and that no temporal logic will be expressive enough unless it has infinitely many
modalities, defined using definitions of unbounded complexity, in terms of quantifier depth.
The paper is divided as follows: In section 2 we recall the definitions and the previous
results concerning the continuous time logics. In section 3 we prove Pnueli’s conjecture and
its generalization, that the modalities Ci create a strictly increasing family of logics. In
section 4 we discuss the more general and abstract result: that no temporal logic based on
modalities with finite quantifier depth can express all the modalities Cn.
2. Monadic Logic and Quantitative Temporal Logic
2.1. MLO - Monadic Logic of Order. The natural way to discuss systems that evolve
in time is classical predicate logic. The language has a name for the order relation of the
time line, and a supply of unary predicate names to denote a properties that the system
may or may not have at any point in time. Hence:
The syntax of the monadic predicate logic of order - MLO has in its vocabulary
individual (first order) variables t0, t1, . . . , monadic predicate variables X0,X1, . . . , and one
binary relation < (the order). Atomic formulas are of the form X(t), t1 = t2 and t1 < t2.
Well formed formulas of the monadic logic MLO are obtained from atomic formulas
using Boolean connectives ¬,∨,∧,→ and the (first order) quantifiers ∃t and ∀t and the
(second-order) quantifiers ∃X and ∀X. The formulas which do not use ∃X and ∀X are
called first-order MLO formulas (FOMLO). Note that FOMLO formulas may contain free
monadic predicate variables, and they will be assigned to particular predicates in a structure.
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A structure for MLO is a tuple M = 〈A,<,P1, . . . , Pn〉, where A is a set linearly
ordered by the relation <, and P1, · · · , Pn, are one-place predicates (sets) that correspond
to the predicate names in the logic. We shall use the simple notation 〈A,<〉 when the
particular predicates are not essential to the discussion.
The main models are: the continuous canonical model 〈R+, <〉, the non-negative
real line, and the discrete canonical model 〈N,<〉, the naturals.
As is common we will use the assigned formal names to refer to objects in the meta
discussion. Thus we will write:
M |= ϕ[t1, . . . , tk;X1, . . . ,Xm]
where M is a structure, ϕ a formula, t1, · · · , tk elements of M and X1, . . . ,Xm predicates
in M , instead of the correct but tedious form:
M, τ1, . . . , τk;P1, . . . , Pm |=
MLO
ϕ(t1, . . . , tk;X1, . . . ,Xm),
where τ1, . . . , τk and P1 · · · , Pm are names in the metalanguage for elements and predicates
in M .
2.2. Temporal Logics. Temporal logics evolved in philosophical logic and were enthusi-
astically embraced by a large body of computer scientists. It uses logical constructs called
“modalities” to create a language that is free from variables and quantifiers. Here is the
general logical framework to define temporal logics:
The syntax of the Temporal Logic TL(O
(k1)
1 , . . . , O
(kn)
n , . . . ) has in its vocabulary
monadic predicate names P1, P2, . . . and a sequence of modality names with prescribed arity,
O
(k1)
1 , . . . , O
(kn)
n , . . . (the arity notation is usually omitted). The formulas of this temporal
logic are given by the grammar:
ϕ ::= True| P | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | O(k)(ϕ1, · · · , ϕk)
A temporal logic with a finite set of modalities is called a finite (base) temporal logic.
Structures for TL are again linear orders equipped with monadic predicates M =
〈A,<,P1, P2, . . . , Pn〉, where the predicate Pi are those which are mentioned in the formulas
of the logic. Every modality O(k) is interpreted in every structure M as an operator O
(k)
M :
[P(A)]k → P(A) which assigns “the set of points where O(k)[S1, . . . , Sk] holds” to the k-tuple
〈S1, . . . , Sk〉 ∈ P(A)
k. (Here P is the power set notation, and P(A) denotes the set of all
subsets of A.) Once every modality corresponds to an operator the semantics is defined by
structural induction:
• for atomic formulas: 〈M, t〉 |=
TL
P iff t ∈ P .
• for Boolean combinations the definition is the usual one.
• for O(k)(ϕ1, · · · , ϕk)
〈M, t〉 |=
TL
O(k)(ϕ1, · · · , ϕk) iff t ∈ O
(k)
M (Aϕ1 , · · · , Aϕk)
where Aϕ = { τ : 〈M, τ〉 |=
TL
ϕ } (we suppressed predicate parameters that may occur
in the formulas).
We are interested in a more restricted case; for the modality to be of interest the operator
O(k) should reflect some intended connection between the sets Aϕi of points satisfying ϕi
and the set of points O[Aϕ1 , . . . , Aϕk ]. The intended meaning is usually given by a formula
in an appropriate predicate logic:
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Truth Tables: A formula O(t0,X1, . . . Xk) in the predicate logic L is a Truth Table
for the modality O(k) if for every structure M
OM (A1, . . . , Ak) = {τ : M |=
MLO
O[τ,A1, . . . , Ak]} .
The modalities until and since are most commonly used in temporal logic for computer
science. They are defined through the following truth tables:
• The modality XU Y , “X until Y ”, is defined by
ψ(t0,X, Y ) ≡ ∃t1(t0 < t1 ∧ Y (t1) ∧ ∀t(t0 < t < t1 → X(t))).
• The modality XS Y , “X since Y ”, is defined by
ψ(t0,X, Y ) ≡ ∃t1(t0 > t1 ∧ Y (t1) ∧ ∀t(t1 < t < t0 → X(t))).
If the modalities of a temporal logic have truth tables in a predicate logic then the temporal
logic is equivalent to a fragment of the predicate logic. Formally:
Proposition 2. If every modality in the temporal logic TL has a truth table in the logic
MLO then to every formula ϕ(X1, . . . ,Xn) of TL there corresponds effectively (and natu-
rally) a formula ϕ(t0,X1, . . . Xn) of MLO such that for every M , τ ∈ M and predicates
P1, . . . , Pn
〈M, τ, P1, . . . , Pn〉 |=
TL
ϕ iff 〈M, τ, P1, . . . , Pn〉 |=
MLO
ϕ .
In particular the temporal logic TL(U,S) with the modalities “until” and “since” cor-
responds to a fragment of first-order MLO (FOMLO).
The two modalities U and S are also enough to express all the formulas of first-order
MLO with one free variable:
Theorem 3. ([13, 6]) The temporal logic TL(U,S) is expressively complete for FOMLO
over the two canonical structures: For every formula of FOMLO with at most one free
variable, there is a formula of TL(U,S), such that the two formulas are equivalent to each
other, over the positive integers (discrete time) and over the positive real line (continuous
time).
2.3. QTL - Quantitative Temporal Logic. The logics MLO and TL(U,S) are not
suitable to deal with quantitative statements like “X will occur within one unit of time”.
In [9, 10, 11] we introduced the Quantitative Temporal Logic, adding to TL the modalities
♦1X (X will happen within the next unit of time) and
←−
♦1X (X happened within the last
unit of time):
Definition 4 (Quantitative Temporal Logic). QTL, quantitative temporal logic is the logic
TL(U,S) enhanced by the two modalities: ♦1X and
←−
♦1X. These modalities are defined
by the tables with free variable t0:
(3) ♦1X : ∃t((t0 < t < t0 + 1) ∧X(t))
(4)
←−
♦1X : ∃t((t < t0 < t+ 1) ∧X(t)) .
QTL was the latest in a list of metric logics for continuous time, developed over ap-
proximately 15 years. When interpreted carefully all these logics are equivalent. We refer
the reader to [15, 3, 2, 14, 5, 18, 1, 7, 8] for some of the previous work.
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The novelty in our approach was the close connection with metric monadic logic, the
replacement of all the automata theory arguments by plain logic and model theory argu-
ments. Most significant however was the fact that our treatment and our results applied
uniformly to the class of systems with finite variability and to the class of all systems. In
contrast, in the previous work, and in particular in the papers cited above, systems without
finite variability could not be defined as the semantics for the logic. Naturally the decid-
ability and complexity results did not apply to systems without finite variability (nor could
the automata approach be adapted to the general case once the definition includes general
systems).
We proved in [10] and [12] that:
(1) QTL consumes the different decidable metric temporal logics that we found in the
literature, including MITL, ECL etc.
(2) There is a natural fragment QMLO (quantitative monadic logic of order), of the clas-
sical monadic logic of order with the +1 function, that is equal in expressive power to
QTL.
(3) The validity and satisfiability problem for this logic is decidable, whether we are inter-
ested in systems with finite variability, or in all systems evolving in time (a system has
finite variability if it changes only at finitely many points, in any finite interval of time).
For the special case of systems with finite variability these results (but not the proof meth-
ods) are in [15, 3, 2, 14, 5, 18, 1, 7, 8], regarding different logics (future, or full), and different
semantics (point sequence and interval sequence).
3. Modalities which are not expressible in QTL
The simple metric temporal logic QTL looks very natural. The main question is if it is
as expressive as is needed. A. Pnueli suggested a natural modality, and conjectured that it
could not be expressed in the simple metric temporal logics of the previous section. This
was the modality that we denote by P2(X,Y ), which says that X and then Y will be true
at two points in the next unit of time. If the conjecture is confirmed then we have a natural
modality to add to the logic. Moreover, there are P3(X,Y,Z) and Pn(X1, , . . . ,Xn) waiting
to be considered as an addition, if they are not redundant.
We attend these questions and we will prove first Pnueli’s conjecture, that P2(X,Y ) is
not expressible in QTL, and then that there is a proper hierarchy of Pnueli modalities that
can be added to strengthen the logic.
Definition 5.
(1) The counting modalities are the modalities Cn(X) for every n which state that X will
be true at least at n points within the next unit of time.
(2) The Pnueli modalities are the modalities Pn(X1, . . . ,Xn) for every n which state that
there is an increasing sequence of points t1, , . . . , tn in the unit interval ahead, such that
for i = 1, , . . . , n, ti is in Xi.
Pnueli’s conjecture is proved by the following theorem:
Theorem 6. The modality C2(X) is not expressible in QTL.
Proof. Let M be the real non negative line with the predicate P (t) that is true exactly
at the points n · 23 for all natural numbers n. Let us call the following four predicates:
P,¬P, True, False the trivial predicates. We show by structural induction that for every
EXPRESSIVENESS OF METRIC MODALITIES FOR CONTINUOUS TIME 7
statement ϕ of QTL there is a point tϕ such that from this point on ϕ is equivalent to one
of the trivial predicates.
• this is trivially true for atomic statements.
• The collection of truth sets for the four trivial predicates is closed under Boolean com-
binations. Therefore the set of formulas satisfying our claim is closed under the Boolean
connectors.
• Assume now that ϕ = (θ U ψ) and t0 is a point beyond which both θ and ψ are equivalent
to one of the trivial predicates. We check the different possibilities for the truth value
of ϕ at a point t beyond t0. If θ is equivalent to P or to False then ϕ is false. If θ is
equivalent to ¬P or to True then ϕ is true if ψ is equivalent to either of P ,¬P or True,
and ϕ is false if ψ is equivalent to False. In every case ϕ is equivalent either to True or
to False.
• For ϕ = (θ Since ψ) we need only a minor modification: Let t1 be an even integer beyond
t0 (so that P is true at t1). Then for points beyond t1 ϕ is true if θ ≡ True and ψ occurred
at t1 or earlier, or if θ ≡ ¬P and ψ is equivalent to any of the special predicates except
False (the choice of t1 ensures the case that ψ ≡ P ) in all other cases ϕ ≡ False.
• Assume that ϕ = ♦1θ and from t0 on θ is equivalent to one of the four trivial predicates.
If θ is equivalent to False then ϕ is equivalent to False from t0 on. In the other three
cases ϕ is equivalent to True from t0 on.
• A similar argument works when ϕ =
←−
♦1θ.
On the other hand the statement C2(P ) is false at any point in the interval (n, n + 1/3) if
n is even and it is true at any point in the interval (n, n+1/3) if n is odd. This shows that
C2(P ) is not equivalent to any QTL formula.
The method of the proof can be adapted to show that the Pnueli modalities yield a
strictly monotone sequence of temporal logics:
Theorem 7. The modality Cn(X) is not expressible in the logic QTL(P2, · · · , Pn−1).
Proof. Let M be the real non negative line with the predicate P (t) that is true exactly
at the points k · 22n−1 for all natural numbers k. Call again the following four predi-
cates: P,¬P, True, False the trivial predicates, and as before show that every formula
of QTL(P2 · · · , Pn−1) is equivalent from some point on to a trivial predicate. The proof
remains the same except for the additional induction step, where we assume that the claim
is true for ϕ1, . . . , ϕn−1. and we must show that it holds for ψ = Pn−1(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn−1). By
assumption there is some point from which on ϕ1, . . . , ϕn−1 are trivial. If any of them is
False then ψ is false from there on. Otherwise ψ is True from there on, because at any
point there are n−1 points of P in the future unit, and between any two, there are infinitely
many points that satisfy ¬P or True.
On the other hand Cn(P ) is always true on the interval (k, k +
1
2n−1 ) if k is even, and
false on the interval if k is odd.
Remark 8. We proved the two theorems for the positive real line. I.e, for continuous time
with a first moment. The same proof applies to the full real line, to the set of rational
numbers or to the set of positive rational numbers.
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4. The incompleteness of temporal logic with finitely many modalities
The hierarchy
TL < QTL < QTL(P2) < · · · < QTL(P2, · · · , Pn) < · · ·
raises the suspicion that it will be difficult to find a finite temporal logic that includes all
these logics. In this section we will prove that it is indeed impossible. To be precise:
Theorem 9. Let L be the second order monadic logic of order, with an extra predicate
B(t, s) that is interpreted on the whole real line as s = t + 1. Let L1 be a temporal logic
with possibly infinitely many modalities, for which there is a natural number m such that all
the modalities have truth tables in L, with quantifier depth not larger than m. Then there
is some n such that Cn(X) is not equivalent over the real line to any L1 formula.
Before we start to work toward the proof we make the following remarks.
(1) Second order monadic logic of order with the +1 function is a much stronger logic
than is usually considered when temporal logics are defined. All the temporal logics
that we saw in the literature are defined in a fragment of monadic logic, with a very
restricted use of the +1 function. All the decidable temporal logics in the literature
remain decidable when we add the counting modalities Cn(X) [11]. On the other hand
second order monadic logic is undecidable over the reals even without the +1 function
[17]. When the +1 function is added even a very restricted fragment of first order
monadic logic of order is undecidable over the positive reals.
(2) The theorem says that there is no finite set of modalities defined in this language that
generates all the counting modalities (and possibly more). It does not exclude the
possibility that a finite set of modalities which are not defined in this logic is (at least)
as strong as QTL(P2, . . . , Pn, . . .). We state it as an open problem:
Question: Is there a finite temporal logic that includes all the modalities
Pn(X1, . . . ,Xn), if we do not require that the modalities are are defined by truth tables?
(3) On the other hand the theorem does not just say that QTL(P2, . . . , Pn, . . .) is not a
sublogic of a logic with finitely many modalities. It is not even a sublogic of an infinite
temporal logic whose modalities are defined with bounded quantifier depth, in a strong
predicate logic.
The proof of theorem 9 involves some more notations, and some steps that are accumulated
in two more theorems.
We will assume that P is the only non variable unary predicate name in L, and we
concentrate on a class of simple models in the language: For each integer k > 0 let Mk
be the full real line R with P (t) occurring at the points m 1
k
for every integer m (positive,
negative or zero).
Terminology.
(1) From now on whenever we say “a model” we mean Mk for some k.
(2) The four formulas {True, False, P,¬P} will be called the trivial temporal logic formu-
las, and the formulas {True, False, P (t0),¬P (t0)} will be called the trivial first-order
formulas.
(3) We say that t is a P -point or that t is in P if P (t) is true.
The choice of the models limits the expressive power of monadic logic:
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Theorem 10. Every formula of second order monadic logic of order, with the unary pred-
icate P and with the extra predicate B(t, s) with one free element variable t0 and no free
predicate variable is equivalent in every model to one of the four trivial formulas.
Proof. Let Mk be given. We show that for every two points t < s in P , there is an
automorphism of the model that maps t to s and for every two points not in P there is such
an automorphism. This will prove that every formula obtains the same truth value on all
points in P and the same truth value on all points not in P . Therefore the formula is true
either everywhere, or only on points in P , or only outside of P , or nowhere.
(1) the mapping G(t) = t + r is an automorphism if r is a multiple of 1
k
. This shows in
particular that every formula obtains a fixed truth value on all points in P .
(2) For every 0 < t < s < 1
k
there is a monotone bijection h(v) : (0, 1
k
) → (0, 1
k
) such that
h(t) = s. Every real t can be written in a unique way as t = m
k
+ τ where m is integer
and 0 ≤ τ < 1
k
, and the bijection extends to an automorphism of the model defining
H(m
k
+ τ) = h(τ) + m
k
. This shows that every formula obtains the same truth value on
the interval (0, 1
k
).
(3) Finally if t = m
k
+ τ where m is integer and 0 ≤ τ < 1
k
then every formula has the same
truth value on t and on τ , so that it is fixed on the complement of P .
Thus every formula is equivalent to one of the four trivial formulas in every model.
Note that it is not necessarily the same trivial formula in the different models. For example
Ck(P ) is equivalent to ¬P inMk and to True in Mk+1. We aim to show that in a temporal
logic based on modalities defined by formulas of bounded quantifier depth, there are always
pairs of models for which any formula is equivalent in both to the same trivial formula.
We denote by Ln the set of formulas of quantifier depthes no more than n of the second
order monadic logic of order with the extra predicate B(t, s). We denote by TLn the
temporal logic with all the modalities that have a truth table in Ln. Every formula of TLn
is equivalent in every model to one of the trivial formulas.
Let now ϕ(t0,X1, . . . ,Xk) be a formula of Ln. Its localizations are the 4
k formulas
ϕ(t0, T1, . . . , Tk) , where T1, . . . , Tk vary over all possible combinations of trivial predicates
P,¬P, True, False. Note that the localizations have the same quantifier depth as the orig-
inal formula, and that beside the predicate name P there are no predicate variables in the
localizations.
Here is the main theorem. Item (4) is the promised result:
Theorem 11. Let n be given and let Sn be the collection of the localizations of all the (truth
tables of) modalities in TLn. Then:
(1) Let M =Mk and M
′ =Ml be models. If there is a formula of TLn which is equivalent
to different trivial formulas in M and in M ′ then there is also such a formula in Sn.
(2) There are finitely many formulas in Sn such that every formula of Sn is logically equiv-
alent to one of them.
(3) There are models Mk and Ml for which any formula of TLn is equivalent to the same
trivial formula in both models.
(4) There are integers k such that Ck(X) is not expressible in TLn.
Proof.
(1) We assume that every formula in Sn is equivalent to the same trivial formula in M and
in M ′ and we prove by structural induction that the same is true for every formula
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ϕ of TLn. If ϕ s atomic it is P or True. If it is a Boolean combination of simpler
formulas then the property is trivially inherited from the simpler formulas. It remains
to check the case where ϕ = O(k)(ϕ1, · · · , ϕk). By assumption for i = 1 · · · k, ϕi is
equivalent in both models to the same trivial formula Ti. If now O(t0,X1, . . . Xk) is
the truth table for the modality O(k)(X1, · · · ,Xk) then ϕ is equivalent in both models
to O(t0, T1, . . . Tk). This is a formula in Sn and therefore expresses the same trivial
predicate in both models.
(2) This is a well known simple property of logics with finite relational signature: For every
n and m there are finitely many quantifier free formulas such that every quantifier free
formula with variables among v1, · · · , vn and Y1, · · · , Ym, is logically equivalent to one
of them. Consequently for every q, m and n there is a finite number of formulas such
that every formula of quantifier depth n (of both first and second order variables) and
in the free variables v1, · · · , vq and Y1, · · · , Ym, is logically equivalent to one of them.
Sn is a special case where q = 1 and m = 0.
(3) Let φ1, . . . , φr be a list of formulas such that every formula of Sn is logically equivalent
to one of the formulas in the list. We partition the class of models into 4r classes
according to which trivial predicate is defined by these r formulas. Then at least one
class is infinite. Every formula in Sn is equivalent in all the models in this class to
the same trivial formula. By (1) any formula of TLn is equivalent to the same trivial
predicate in all models in this class.
(4) Let now Mk and Ml be in this infinite class with k < l. Ck(P ) is equivalent to ¬P in
Mk and to True in Ml. However, by (3) and our choice of k and l, every formula of
TLn is equivalent to the same trivial formula in both models Mk and Ml. This shows
that Ck is not equivalent to any TLn formula.
The proof of theorem 9 is just item 4 in theorem 11.
Some remarks are in order:
(1) The theorem speaks about the whole real line, and not about its non negative part R+.
We believe that it is true also for the model of non negative reals, but we did not pursue
the proof, which is complicated by everything that can be said about 0, and therefore
about every particular n, and about every particular interval (n, n+ 1). We state it as
a question:
Question: Is the theorem above true when the real line R is replaced by its non
negative part R+?
(2) The completeness of the real line was never used and the same proof works for the
model of the rational numbers.
(3) Adding just a “+1” function is weaker than adding the functions “+q” for every rational
number q. Let us denote by LQ the monadic logic of order with predicates Bq(t, s) for
every rational umber q, to express the relation s = t+ q. The proof of the theorem will
not apply if we replace L by LQ, and even modalities with truth tables of quantifier
depth 2 distinguish between any two models Mk and Mr in our class. On the other
hand just as before no finite temporal logic defined in this logic can express all the
counting modalities. This is the case because any finite number of modalities defined in
LQ involves only finitely many rational numbers in the formulas Bq(t, s) that occur in
the definition. Let q0 be a rational such that all of these rational are whole integers of
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q0. Then we can repeat the proof above with q0 replacing 1. We do not know whether
infinitely many modalities defined with bounded quantifier depth may suffice:
Question: Is the theorem above true when the predicate logic L is replaced by LQ?
5. Conclusion
Temporal logic does not have quantifiers, and formulas become more complex only due
to deeper nesting of modalities. By Kamp’s theorem this suffices to capture the expressive
power that is achieved in predicate logic by quantifier depth, and the pure temporal logic
with its two modalities is as expressive as the pure monadic logic of order. We proved that in
the more general setting of a metric temporal logic, nesting of modalities is strictly weaker
than nesting of quantifiers. Only a set of modalities defined with unbounded quantifier
depth can capture all the counting modalities Cn(X).
References
[1] R. Alur, T. Feder, T.A. Henzinger. The Benefits of Relaxing Punctuality. Journal of the ACM 43
116-146, (1996).
[2] R. Alur, T.A. Henzinger. Logics and Models of Real Time: a survey. In Real Time: Theory and Practice.
Editors de Bakker et al. LNCS 600 74-106, (1992).
[3] H. Barringer, R. Kuiper, A. Pnueli. A really abstract concurrent model and its temporal logic. Proceed-
ings of the 13th annual symposium on principles of programing languages 173-183, (1986).
[4] H.D. Ebbinghaus, J. Flum, Finite Model Theory. Perspectives in mathematical logic, Springer (1991).
[5] D.M. Gabbay, I. Hodkinson, M. Reynolds. Temporal Logics volume 1. Clarendon Press, Oxford (1994).
[6] D.M. Gabbay, A. Pnueli, S. Shelah, J. Stavi. On the Temporal Analysis of Fairness. 7th ACM Sympo-
sium on Principles of Programming Languages. Las Vegas 163-173, (1980).
[7] T.A. Henzinger. It’s about time: real-time logics reviewed. In Concur 98, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science 1466, pp. 439-454, (1998).
[8] T.H Henziger, J.F Raskin, P.Y Schobbens. The regular real time languages. ICALP98, pp. 580-591,
(1998).
[9] Y. Hirshfeld and A. Rabinovich, A Framework for Decidable Metrical Logics. In Proc. 26th ICALP
Colloquium, LNCS vol.1644, pp. 422-432, Springer Verlag, (1999).
[10] Y. Hirshfeld and A. Rabinovich. Quantitative Temporal Logic. In Computer Science Logic 1999, LNCS
vol. 1683, pp. 172-187, Springer Verlag (1999).
[11] Y. Hirshfeld and A. Rabinovich, Logics for Real Time: Decidability and Complexity. Fundam. Inform.
62(1):1-28 (2004).
[12] Y. Hirshfeld and A. Rabinovich, Timer formulas and decidable metric temporal logic. Information and
Computation Vol 198(2), pp. 148-178, (2005).
[13] H. Kamp. Tense Logic and the Theory of Linear Order. Ph.D. thesis, University of California L.A.
(1968).
[14] Z. Manna, A. Pnueli. Models for reactivity. Acta informatica 30:609-678, (1993).
[15] R. Koymans. Specifying Real-Time Properties with Metric Temporal Logic. Real-Time Systems
2(4):255-299, (1990).
[16] A. Rabinovich. Expressive Power of Temporal Logics In Proc. 13th Int. Conf. on Concurrency Theory,
vol. 2421 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 57–75. Springer, (2002).
[17] S. Shelah. The monadic theory of order. Ann. of Math., 102, pp. 349-419, (1975).
[18] T. Wilke. Specifying Time State Sequences in Powerful Decidable Logics and Time Automata. In Formal
Techniques in Real Time and Fault Tolerance Systems. LNCS 863, pp. 694-715, (1994).
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs License. To view
a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.0/ or send a
letter to Creative Commons, 559 Nathan Abbott Way, Stanford, California 94305, USA.
